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Abstract
This article represents an effort to extend our understanding of paranoia or suspicion and its development by integrating findings across clinical,
developmental, and neuroscience literatures. We first define “paranoia” or paranoid thought and examine its prevalence across typically and atypically
developing individuals and theoretical perspectives regarding its development and maintenance. We then briefly summarize current ideas regarding the neural
correlates of adaptive, appropriately trusting interpersonal perception, social cognition, and behavior across development. Our focus shifts subsequently to
examining in normative and atypical developmental contexts the neural correlates of several component cognitive processes thought to contribute to paranoid
thinking: (a) attention bias for threat, (b) jumping to conclusions biases, and (c) hostile intent attribution biases. Where possible, we also present data regarding
independent links between these cognitive processes and aggressive behavior. By examining data regarding the behavioral and neural correlates of varied
cognitive processes that are likely components of a paranoid thinking style, we hope to advance both theoretical and empirical research in this domain.

Beliefs that “others are likely to mistreat me” occur from childhood throughout the life span; some authors argue that such
beliefs are becoming increasingly common (Freeman & Freeman, 2009). It is thus not surprising that the term paranoia has
migrated from the clinical literature into the popular lexicon
(Freeman & Freeman, 2008). Although paranoia originally
signified psychopathology or madness (Lewis, 1970), the
word now more broadly denotes “a tendency on the part of
an individual or group toward excessive or irrational suspiciousness and distrustfulness of others” (Merriam-Webster,
2012). For many individuals, beliefs that appear paranoid
stem from real life experiences and may constitute rational responses to threatening environments. Discrimination and microaggression (Rippy & Newman, 2006; Sue, Capodilupo, &
Holder, 2008), economic inequity (Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner, & Prothrow-Stith, 1997), peer rejection and bullying
(Campbell & Morrison, 2007; Schreier et al., 2009), and
childhood abuse and neglect (De Loore et al., 2007; Lataster
et al., 2006; Natsuaki, Cicchetti, & Rogosch, 2009; Price &
Glad, 2003) all predict biases or proclivities to anticipate physical or psychological aggression from others. As each of the
studies cited above also illustrates, however, the correspondence between negative life experiences and paranoid thinking is far from perfect. Many individuals who experience mistreatment never develop paranoid ideas or conceptualize
ostensibly benign others as sources of danger; conversely,
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Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Erin B. Tone, Department of Psychology, P.O. Box 5010, Georgia State University, Atlanta,
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not all individuals who hold such beliefs show clear histories
of having been aggression targets.
Further, although some evidence links paranoid/suspicious
attitudes or related types of beliefs and biases to concurrent or
later aggressive behavior (e.g., Bjørkly, 2002; De Castro et al.,
2002; Dodge, 1980; Haggård-Grann, Hallqvist, Långström, &
Möller, 2006), associations vary according to the ways in
which suspicious or paranoid perceptions and attributions
are operationally defined (e.g., cognitive biases vs. impairing
clinical symptoms), the types of aggression under study (e.g.,
reactive, physical, relational, instrumental), the affective contexts in which suspicious beliefs manifest (e.g., anxious, angry, depressed), and individual demographic characteristics
such as age (Bailey & Ostrov, 2008; Bjørkly, 2002; De Castro,
Veerman, Koops, Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002). Thus, the
likely complex ways in which aggression and paranoid patterns of thought might fuel or inhibit each other’s development remain unclear.
The results from a number of studies provide evidence that
it may be useful to examine the associations with aggressive
behavior separately for clinically significant delusional paranoia and normal-range suspiciousness. The relationship between delusions that one is at risk of harm from others or delusions that override typical self-control (threat/control
override delusions) and violence has received substantive attention in the literature; the findings have yielded mixed results. Data regarding the associations between a broadly suspicious stance and violence are sparser; however, the findings
from at least one study suggest that this relationship merits
closer attention (Appelbaum, Robbins, & Monahan, 2000).
A number of studies since 1990 have yielded evidence of a
strong relationship between threat/control override delusions

1031

1032

and violence in adult psychiatric patients (Hodgins, Hiscoke,
& Freese, 2003; Link, Monahan, Stueve, & Cullen, 1999;
Link & Stueve, 1994; Swanson, Borum, Swartz, & Monahan,
1996; Swanson et al., 1997). In contrast to these retrospectively designed studies, however, the MacArthur Study of
Violence Risk (Monahan, 2002; Monahan et al., 2001), a
large-scale, prospective longitudinal study of violence in the
community among adults discharged from psychiatric hospitals, found a nonsignificant association between delusional
beliefs that others intended one harm or controlled one’s
thoughts or actions and violent behavior in the subsequent
year (Appelbaum et al., 2000). Some more recent studies suggest that accounting for moderating variables, such as severity
of violent offenses (Stompe, Ortwein-Swoboda, & Schanda,
2004) or gender (Teasdale, Silver, & Monahan, 2006), may
help explain discrepancies among research results.
Although it has yielded limited evidence of associations
between delusions and violence in psychiatric patients, the
MacArthur Study of Violence Risk has produced support
for the idea that a generally suspicious attitude toward others,
marked by anger and impulsivity, significantly predicts later
violent behavior, including physical and sexual assault (Appelbaum et al., 2000). Other lines of research in nonclinical
samples also suggest links between aggression and both focal
individual and diffuse societal suspicion. Suspicions of infidelity, for instance, have been tied to risk for intimate partner
violence among men (Kaighobadi & Shackelford, 2009;
Kaighobadi, Starratt, Shackelford, & Popp, 2008), and a suspicious cognitive schema has been linked similarly to male
sexual aggression (Malamuth & Brown, 1994). In addition,
qualitative research findings indicate that among male youths
in conflict-ridden regions such as Northern Ireland, suspicious attitudes partly fuel a subculture of violence (Harland,
2011). More research into the associations between normalrange suspicion and aggression is clearly needed; a focus
on subclinical paranoia may be of particular value in studies
of children and young adolescents, who rarely exhibit clinically significant paranoid thoughts but are likely to show
broad variability in the emergence of normative suspicions.
A Developmental Psychopathology Perspective
on Paranoia and Aggression
Several tenets drawn from the developmental psychopathology perspective provide a coherent and useful framework
for examining the relationship between paranoid or suspicious types of thinking and aggression, as well as putative
mechanisms underlying this relationship as they emerge
and change across the life span (Cicchetti, 2006; Cicchetti
& Cohen, 1995). This perspective asserts that multiple factors
interact in a dynamic, transactional manner to influence the
emergence of both adaptive and maladaptive patterns of
thought, affect, and behavior. The effects of a given etiological factor can vary dramatically, depending on the contexts in
which the factor manifests (principle of multifinality); conversely, a given outcome can emerge from the influences of
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a wide range of factors (principle of equifinality). Thus, the
appearance of paranoia or suspicion at any particular point
in development depends on the ever-changing interplay
among vulnerabilities and risk or protective factors for a
given individual.
The developmental psychopathology perspective also emphasizes the value inherent in concurrently examining both
normal and atypical patterns of development (Cicchetti,
2006; Cicchetti & Cohen, 1995). This emphasis is particularly important in light of ongoing debates about the relative
merits of categorical and dimensional models of function and
dysfunction (David, 2010; Kessler, 2002); unless we understand normal or adaptive developmental paths, what constitutes significant deviation from these paths, and both when
and how individuals might come to veer from them, we are
unlikely to generate accurate models of dysfunction. The ability to detect or anticipate threats in the social environment, for
instance, is a critically important interpersonal skill from
childhood onward; only under some circumstances and in
certain individuals does this capacity become problematic
or dysfunctional (Green & Phillips, 2004). A clear understanding of normative experiences of paranoia or suspiciousness, contextualized appropriately according to an individual’s current developmental stage, is thus a necessary
component of research on their pathological manifestations.
Several rich literatures shed light both on ways in which
paranoid beliefs or interpersonal suspiciousness might develop and on factors, particularly biologically based characteristics, that might strengthen or weaken their links to aggressive behavior. Ample clinical research has examined
delusional paranoid or persecutory beliefs in the context of
psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia (Bentall, 1994;
Freeman, 2010); more recently, this line of work has expanded
to consider mechanisms and correlates of “normal-range”
paranoid beliefs, primarily among adults, in the broader community (Freeman et al., 2005; Green et al., 2011). Research in
these veins has yielded information about cognitive processes
that may combine to yield paranoid types of ideation. In addition, although less is known about neural mechanisms that underlie these processes, particularly in the context of active
paranoid or suspicious thought, studies are beginning to appear that provide suggestive evidence about adaptive and maladaptive ways in which the brain implements them.
The literature that explicitly examines paranoia in both
clinical and normal ranges, however, is notably limited by
its heavy focus on adults. Attention to a set of distinct but related bodies of research that more tightly integrate developmental, cognitive, and neuroscience studies may better help
illuminate how this style of thought begins and evolves in
early life at psychological and neural levels. These literatures
trace the emergence, maintenance, and potential mechanisms
of several cognitive biases and anomalies that careful empirical work has identified as probable components of paranoid
thought. Given that the construct of paranoia encompasses
both cognitive and affective components (Freeman, 2007),
it may also be helpful to examine how these biases and atyp-
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ical patterns emerge in the context of varied emotional states,
such as anxiety, depression, and general negative affect.
Such an examination of constructs that map onto portions
of the conceptual space that paranoia occupies has advantages. In particular, it facilitates the integration of the distinct
insights that multiple literatures offer into putative foundations and developmental courses of excessive or irrational
suspiciousness and distrustfulness of others. By reviewing
them in an integrated fashion, we aim to advance the understanding of the ways in which individual biological characteristics, such as patterns of structure and activity in the brain,
interact dynamically over time with environmental contexts
to yield paranoid types of cognitive and emotional experience
and, in some cases, elevated risk for aggression.
We first define paranoia or paranoid thought and examine
its prevalence across the life span in both clinical and community contexts. We then summarize theoretical models that
postulate core components of paranoia that span both cognitive and affective domains. Finally, we review the literature
on neural correlates of both paranoia and several critical component processes and examine whether and how convergent
findings overlap with data regarding neural risk factors for aggressive behavior.
Paranoia
Definitions and prevalence
The term paranoia was initially used in ancient Greece to
describe those who were “mad” or “out of their minds”; in
subsequent centuries, it evolved in meaning across both
time and language (Lewis, 1970). By the early 20th century,
however, the American and European medical and psychological literatures were notably consistent in defining paranoia as a clinical state marked by delusions or false beliefs
that are firmly maintained, even in the face of indisputable
evidence that they are false (Merriam-Webster, 2012). Although delusions vary widely in content, in the context of
paranoia they tend to manifest as delusions of reference,
with a tendency toward either “ideas of injury” (e.g., persecutory delusions) or “ideas of exaltation” (Kraepelin, 1921,
p. 220). Such traditional definitions classify paranoid thinking as a psychotic process marked by disconnection from reality, such that “numerous impressions and occurrences are not
accepted in their sober every-day character, but they enter into
some or other relation to the patient’s own fortunes and misfortunes” (Kraepelin, 1921, p. 217).
However, a parallel definition that encompasses paranoid
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors that are not associated with
psychosis also emerged in the early 20th century (e.g.,
Kant, 1927). Paranoia has since become widely used in ordinary, nonclinical discourse and the popular media to denote
exaggerated or, in some cases, baseless fears or beliefs that
others intend you harm or distress (Keltner & Davidson,
2009). Theorists have argued for decades that processes
such as paranoid thought, which have historically been con-
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sidered psychotic, might be better conceptualized as “points
on continua of function” (Strauss, 1969, p. 581) or as quasicontinuous variables with both dichotomous and continuous
characteristics (van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul,
& Krabbendam, 2009; van Os & Verdoux, 2003).
Such continua could be defined in terms of an individual’s
certainty that atypical experiences are objectively real, the
ways in which cultural and environmental factors support
such beliefs, the degree of preoccupation with atypical experiences, and the extent to which others find the experiences
plausible (Strauss, 1969). Individuals who do not meet the
criteria for active psychosis and who function adequately in
their typical environments could thus still occupy points toward the paranoid ends of these continua, but not at the extremes. This set of ideas has attracted renewed attention in recent years (Linscott & van Os, 2010), provoking considerable
controversy (e.g., Braithwaite, 2008; Freeman, 2008). Active
debate continues about proposals that symptoms such as paranoia, when they manifest persistently at distressing but still
subclinical levels, be assigned to diagnostic categories such
as “attenuated psychosis syndrome” (Carpenter, van Os, &
van Os, 2011) that signify elevated risk for progression to active psychosis.
Epidemiological data lend support to the idea that paranoid thought might be best conceptualized as distributed
along continua such as those that Strauss (1969) proposed,
with relatively few individuals clustered at the extremes. In
particular, much evidence indicates that full-blown, clinically
significant delusions of persecution are rare at any stage of development. For example, although nearly 10% of 6,455 12year-old participants in the Avon Longitudinal Study of Pregnancy and Childhood responded “yes” or “maybe” when
asked if they believed others were persecuting them, follow-up interviews confirmed clinically significant paranoid
delusions of persecution in only 0.3% (Horwood et al.,
2008). Similarly, in a careful epidemiological study of adults’
responses to screening questions about nonaffective psychotic symptoms, only 0.8% of 2,232 participants endorsed
such beliefs; further probing suggested that roughly a fifth
of those individuals who reported delusions of persecution
were reporting culturally appropriate, realistic, or odd but
nonpsychotic thoughts (Kessler et al., 2005). Comparable
rates were evident in a study of 894 nondemented older adults
(aged 70–82 years) in Sweden, with paranoid symptoms evident in less than 2% of the sample, regardless of whether the
participant or a close relative or friend served as the informant
(Sigström et al., 2009).
“Normal-range” paranoid thinking or suspiciousness, in
contrast, appears much more pervasive (for a review, see
Freeman, 2007). Horwood and colleagues’ (2008) findings
suggest that a sizable proportion of healthy youths are vulnerable to at least mild or transient beliefs that others intend them
harm, and studies of community and college-student samples
of adults across varied cultural contexts yield similar results.
Research examining data from different waves (2000 and
2008) of the Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey in England,
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for example, has shown that even when individuals with
probable psychosis were excluded, 18.6% to 21.2% of the
general adult population endorsed broad beliefs that people
were “against them” and 1.5% to 1.8% reported that there
had been plots to cause them serious harm (Freeman et al.,
2011; Johns et al., 2004). Chan and colleagues (2011) found
comparable, if slightly lower, rates of normal-range paranoid
ideation in a sample of nearly 5,000 Chinese undergraduates.
In one of the few adult epidemiological studies to distinguish between plausible and implausible suspicious beliefs,
van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, and Ravelli (2000) found that 8.7%
of 18- to 64-year-old participants in the Netherlands Mental
Health Survey and Incidence Study reported persecutory or
other delusional experiences that clinicians deemed “not
clinically relevant” and a further 3.8% reported similar beliefs
that the researchers identified as plausible. Notably, such subclinical experiences proved persistent for a proportion of the
sample; at 2-year follow-up, 8% of individuals who had previously reported subclinical symptoms such as delusions reported that their symptoms had recurred (Hanssen, Bak,
Bijl, Vollebergh, & van Os, 2005).
Theoretical models of paranoid thought
With remarkable prescience about the now mounting evidence that paranoid patterns of thought occur regularly outside of the context of psychosis, Cameron (1943) published
a cogent review in which he conceptualized paranoid thought
as a “disorder of interpretation” (p. 220) that is not limited to
individuals who are actively psychotic. He noted that “the
possibilities of misinterpretation are being continuously realized in every normal person from a very early age” (p. 220),
such that “even normal persons can build up fairly comprehensive systems of misrepresentation in a very little time”
(p. 221). In Cameron’s view, it is critical that considerations
of paranoia take into account the roles not only of biological
diatheses and psychological processes but also of social and
environmental contexts that may foster the emergence of
paranoid thought. In its clear integration of processes at multiple levels of analysis as contributing factors to adaptive and
maladaptive behavior, this conceptualization presaged the developmental psychopathology perspective that has been
firmly established since the 1980s and 1990s and that guides
the present review (Cicchetti, 1993; Cicchetti & Toth, 1998;
Sroufe & Rutter, 1984).
However, since Cameron, despite calls for developmental
research from leading scholars in the field (Freeman, 2007),
surprisingly few researchers and theorists have explored the
transactional processes that might lead a child to develop
into an adult who is prone to paranoid or suspicious thinking
but is not psychotic. A few studies in the late 20th century examined developmental pathways through which normalrange paranoid patterns of thought might emerge; however,
they focused on specific environmental predictors rather
than patterns of interplay among relevant biological, psychological, social, and cultural variables. Heilbrun (1971, 1972,
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1973), for example, conducted a series of studies in the 1960s
and 1970s exploring the associations between retrospectively
perceived maternal aversive control/lack of nurturance and
undergraduate males’ demonstration of a personality style
marked by vulnerability to paranoid patterns of thought and
behavior. This work stood for a period of time as a rare example of a developmental model of normal-range paranoia;
however, as researchers moved toward more integrative and
comprehensive prospective explanatory models, this line of
thinking faded from attention and little empirical or theoretical work has emerged to replace or extend it.
The lack of developmentally oriented research in this domain may at least partially reflect continued adherence to
classic definitions of paranoia as a manifestation of psychosis, which affects relatively few individuals, particularly early
in life (Biederman, Petty, Faraone, & Seidman, 2004; Polanczyk et al., 2010). The notable dearth of published research on
paranoid thinking in childhood and adolescence may also
stem partly from concerns about the risks of prematurely or
inaccurately attaching potentially damaging labels to individual children; such risks have been the topic of ample debate
over the past several decades (e.g., Leigh, 1983; MacCulloch,
2010). Given the high rates of childhood exposure to bullying, abuse, and other experiences that may lead youths to rationally anticipate negative treatment from others, these concerns
make sense with regard to the label of paranoid. However, if
we are to prevent or circumvent the emergence of distressing
and potentially disabling paranoid ideation in adulthood, it
is important that its developmental roots and antecedents be clarified (Bailey, Whittle, Farnworth, & Smedley, 2007).
Fortunately, decades of careful study of persecutory delusions and related patterns of thought among adults has
yielded evidence that multiple cognitive processes whose developmental trajectories are well mapped may contribute to
the formation of persecutory delusions not only among adults
with schizophrenia (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood,
& Kinderman, 2001; Blackwood et al., 2004; Blackwood,
Howard, Bentall, & Murray, 2001) but also in patient samples
that cross a range of diagnostic categories (Bentall et al.,
2009). A related and rapidly expanding line of research suggests further that the same processes may be relevant to the
emergence of paranoid thinking in nonclinical populations
as well (Freeman, 2007; Freeman et al., 2005; Green et al.,
2011). These perceptual and inferential processes, some of
which are more consistently documented than others, include
attention and recall biases for threat cues (Bentall, Kaney, &
Bowen-Jones, 1995; Kaney, Wolfenden, Dewey, & Bentall,
1992), a tendency to jump to conclusions when engaging in
probabilistic reasoning (So et al., 2011), and exaggerated
and labile causal and intent attribution biases (Bentall & Kaney, 2005; Combs et al., 2009; Kinderman & Bentall, 1997;
Randall, Corcoran, Day, & Bentall, 2003). Several additional
cognitive processes, which overlap to varying degrees with
those noted above, have also been implicated in paranoid
thinking; these include deficits in theory of mind (Mehl
et al., 2010; Randall et al., 2003), intolerance of ambiguity
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(Bentall & Swarbrick, 2003), biased use of the availability
heuristic (Bennett & Corcoran, 2010), and elevated self-focused attention (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998; Fenigstein,
1995).
The following sections first briefly summarize current
ideas regarding the neural correlates of adaptive, appropriately trusting interpersonal perception, social cognition, and
behavior across development. We then examine several component cognitive processes thought to contribute to paranoid
thinking, highlighting both evidence regarding their neural
mechanisms in both normative and atypical development
and, where possible, data regarding their independent links
to aggressive behavior. Each of the processes listed in the preceding paragraph is worthy of detailed attention; however, in
the interest of brevity and clarity, we elected to focus on only
three. Each of these three is relatively narrow in scope, yet incorporates multiple aspects of social cognition; has been examined to some degree across development; and has some
documented evidence regarding potentially relevant neural
mechanisms: (a) attention bias for threat, (b) jumping to conclusions biases, and (c) hostile intent attribution biases.
Neural Mechanisms of Adaptive Interpersonal
Perception and Behavior
Early social development comprises an array of interrelated
tasks that include learning to regulate one’s own behavior,
thoughts, and emotions in the context of rapidly changing interpersonal cues that vary in their personal relevance for each
individual and that signal, with varying degrees of clarity,
whether another’s intentions are hostile or benign (Bradley,
2000; Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000). Mastering these skills is
of critical importance for effective social functioning. Individuals who overlook or misread salient interpersonal cues
are at heightened risk for inaccurately assuming or anticipating that others mean them harm; individuals who struggle to
regulate their emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions
to social cues, particularly those that they have misread, are
vulnerable to respond inappropriately, potentially with aggression (Blackwood et al., 2001; Crick & Dodge, 1994).
Mastery of these social cognitive tasks and consequent diminished risk of interpersonal problems is most likely to occur in children who inhabit supportive environments (Landry
& Smith, 2010) and who also experience healthy maturation
of the social information processing network (SIPN), a core
set of functionally linked neural structures, and a diverse
group of additional regions with which the SIPN component
structures share connections (Blakemore, 2008; Burnett, Sebastian, Cohen, & Blakemore, 2011; Nelson, Leibenluft,
McClure, & Pine, 2005; Paterson, Heim, Friedman, Choudhury, & Benasich, 2006).
Although this loosely defined network functions as a unified whole, Nelson and colleagues (2005) parse it descriptively into three dynamically interactive “nodes,” each of
which plays distinct roles in processing and responding to social cues. Processing initiates in structures within the detec-
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tion node, which support the identification and decoding of
salient cues in the social environment. Structures within
this node, some of which show sophisticated patterns of function as early as the first 3 months of life, include the superior
temporal sulcus, fusiform face area, and inferior temporal and
occipital cortices (Johnson et al., 2005; Tzourio-Mazoyer
et al., 2002).
Once social cues have been perceived, structures within
the affective node, including, but not limited to, the amygdala, ventral striatum, septum, and ventral tegmental area,
evaluate their reward or punishment value and support the
generation of relevant and appropriate responses (Adolphs,
Tranel, & Damasio, 1998; McGinty et al., 2011; O’Doherty,
2011). Of note, the amygdala, septum, and ventral tegmental
area have also been implicated in the generation and maintenance of trusting behavior in adults (Koscik & Tranel, 2011;
Krueger et al., 2007). The early developmental course of human structures in this node is still poorly understood; however, evidence from studies of nonhuman species suggests
that their functional properties, like those of structures in
the detection node, may come on line in the first year of
life (Schumann, Bauman, & Amaral, 2011; Stopczynski, Poloskey, & Haber, 2008; Tau & Peterson, 2010).
These brain regions appear to grow steadily, undergoing
changes in structure and function at the onset of puberty
(Brenhouse & Andersen, 2011; Burnett et al., 2011; Giedd,
Castellanos, Rajapakse, Vaituzis, & Rapoport, 1997; Giedd
et al., 1999). Notably, as Ernst and Fudge’s (2009) triadic
model of motivated behavior suggests, structures within the
affective node appear to follow distinct developmental trajectories during adolescence that lead to imbalances in function.
Specifically, striatally mediated reward responsiveness takes
precedence over amygdala-mediated punishment or threat
avoidance, as a function of differential patterns across regions
of both anatomical development and regulatory input from
prefrontal cortical structures.
More complex integrative functions, such as attributing
mental states to others, inhibiting prepotent responses, and
generating goal-directed behavior, appear to engage structures within the cognitive-regulatory node, which is distributed primarily across regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC;
Nelson et al., 2005). Considerable evidence indicates that prefrontal areas within the cognitive-regulatory node, as well as
their reciprocal white matter projections to the affective/detection nodes and other salient regions, continue to develop
throughout childhood and into early adulthood, paralleling
the emergence of increasingly sophisticated cognitive skills
(Asato, Terwilliger, Woo, & Luna, 2010; Gogtay et al.,
2004). Given the complexity of the functions that this node
mediates, it is likely that additional brain regions also support
their implementation.
Recent reviews, for instance, highlight evidence that areas
within the insula and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) may operate as a “saliency network” that triggers prefrontal attentional, control, and response processes as a function of select
input from sensory components of the detection node (Med-
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ford & Critchley, 2010; Menod & Uddin, 2010). Further, a
growing body of research points to important roles for the posterior superior temporal sulcus and temporoparietal junction
(TPJ) in mentalizing or reflecting on one’s own and others’
mental states (Bahneman, Dziobek, Prehn, Wolf, & Heekeren,
2010; Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2005).
Structures within each of the three SIPN nodes thus likely
play important roles in supporting and implementing adaptive social cognition and behavior. Across development,
however, some evidence suggests that different nodes carry
more weight at some times than at others in influencing social
thought and outcomes. It then follows that perturbations in
one region or another may also vary in their functional impact, depending on an individual’s current developmental
stage. In the following section we briefly summarize the literature on three of the postulated cognitive components of
paranoid thought, with an emphasis on what is known about
their neural correlates across development, particularly within
the SIPN. We summarize highlighted neuroimaging findings
in Table 1.
Cognitive Components of Paranoid Thought
Attention bias for threat
For humans, as well as members of other species, the capacity
to monitor the environment accurately for signs of threat to
oneself is critical for survival (Ledoux, 1996). In a variety
of clinical conditions, however, threat cues assume excessive
salience, leading individuals to develop a pattern of hypervigilance or attentional bias toward threat (Gotlib et al.,
2004; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Werthmann et al., 2011) that
in turn may negatively bias interpretation of ambiguous
cues (White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, Fox, 2011). Although
attention biases for threat have been most comprehensively
documented in the context of anxiety (for a review, see
Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakersman-Kranenburg, &
van IJzendoorn, 2007), some studies suggest that adults vulnerable to paranoid thought, both those with clinically significant persecutory delusions (e.g., Bentall & Kaney, 1989;
Kinderman, 1994; Leafhead, Young, & Szulecka, 1996)
and those who endorse normal-range paranoid ideation
(e.g., Arguedas, Green, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2006), show
a similar bias to overattend to different types of threat cues,
even in the absence of real danger. However, the findings
are mixed; other research has failed to detect such biases in
either clinically delusional individuals or nonpsychotic adults
who are prone to delusions (Lim, Gleeson, & Jackson, 2011;
Taylor & John, 2004). Despite the inconclusive findings in
studies focused explicitly on individuals with paranoid or delusional tendencies, striking associations and overlaps between the constructs of paranoia and social anxiety (in which
attentional biases for threat consistently emerge) suggest that
further examination of threat attention biases in the context of
paranoid thought may be of value (Freeman et al., 2008;
Tone, Goulding, & Compton, 2011).
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Evidence is mixed regarding whether and how attention
bias for threatening or other emotional cues changes across
the life span, and the conclusions that can be drawn are limited by the relatively small number of studies of children and
older adults (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Although some have
proposed that a threat bias is normative early in development
but decreases as children mature (Kindt, Bierman, & Brosschot, 1997; Kindt, van den Hout, de Jong, & Hoekzema,
2000), studies vary in the degree to which their findings conform to this proposal (Monk et al., 2006; Morren, Kindt, van
den Hout, & van Kasteren, 2003; Waters, Lipp, & Spence,
2004). In adults, attention biases for threat have been found
most consistently in the context of varied types of psychopathology (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Gotlib et al., 2004;
Mogg & Bradley, 1998); conversely, attention biases for positive cues appear to strengthen with increasing age in healthy
samples (Lindstrom et al., 2009; Mather & Carstensen, 2005).
Neural mechanisms of attention bias for threat have received some research attention, particularly in anxious adults
and adolescents. Bishop (2008) proposed an elegant and
comprehensive model that describes putative anxiety-associated neural mechanisms of a selective bias for attention to
threat cues. According to this biased competition model,
“lower-order” brain regions such as the amygdala, which detect and evaluate stimulus salience, and “higher-order” cortical regions, including the lateral PFC and anterior cingulate,
which exert control over postperceptual attention and cognitive processing, compete for resources in the presence of
perceived threats. Anxiety modulates the function of this system at different levels that span the detection, affective, and
cognitive-regulatory nodes that implement healthy social
thought and behavior. First, state anxiety amplifies the amygdala response to a detected threat. Second, trait anxiety disrupts attentional, inhibitory, and executive functions mediated by the ACC and lateral PFC. Bishop’s (2008) model
focuses explicitly on ways in which anxiety may contribute
to biased attentional processing for threat cues; given evidence that individuals vulnerable to paranoid patterns of
thought also commonly demonstrate high levels of anxiety
or other negative affect (Freeman, Brugha, Meltzer, Jenkins,
Stahl, & Bebbington, 2010; Tone et al., 2011), it seems plausible that a comparable, if not identical, biased competition
model operates in threat attention biases associated with
paranoia.
Neuroimaging research findings to date have yielded a
range of findings that lend mixed support to Bishop’s
(2008) model (Monk et al., 2004, 2006; Pourtois, Schwartz,
Seghier, Lazeyras, & Vuilleumier, 2006; Telzer et al.,
2008). Interpretation of this small literature, however, is complicated by methodological and sampling variations across
studies. In healthy adults, Monk and colleagues (2004) found
evidence of a progressively increasing bias away from angry
faces that was accompanied by increases in occipitotemporal
activation. In contrast, using a different task paradigm that incorporated fearful rather than angry faces as stimuli, Pourtois
and colleagues (2006) found preferential activation in a net-
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Table 1. Summary of relevant neuroimaging findings
Study (Grouped
by Domain)

Behavioral Task

Neuroimaging Results

Population Sampled

Sample Size

Attention Bias for Threat
Monk et al.
(2004)

Attention bias for angry/happy
faces

Pourtois et al.
(2006)

Covert orienting toward fearful/
happy faces

Telzer et al.
(2008)

Attention bias for angry/happy
faces

Monk et al.
(2006)

Attention bias for angry/happy
faces

Lindstrom et al.
(2009)

Attention bias for angry/happy
faces

Increases in bias away from angry faces
correlated positively with
occipitotemporal activation
Increased activation in intraparietal and
orbitofrontal cortex for targets
following invalid fearful faces;
increased activation in right lateral
occipital cortex for targets following
valid fearful faces
Trait anxiety associated with increased
right DLPFC activation on trials
reflecting attentional bias for angry
faces
Anxiety disorder associated with both
increased ventral lPFC activation to
angry face trials and bias away from
angry faces
Nonsignificant correlations between
age and angry-face attention bias
scores and brain activation to angry
faces; age correlated with left cuneus
and left caudate activation in
association with bias toward happy
faces

Healthy adult

N ¼ 12

Healthy adult

N ¼ 15

Healthy adolescent

N ¼ 20

Adolescent (clinical
and healthy)

N ¼ 18 (anxiety
disorder); n ¼ 15
(control)

Healthy adult/
adolescent

N ¼ 37 (aged 9–40
years)

Adult (simulated
models of neural
activity based on
data from five
published studies)

NA

Adult (clinical and
healthy)

N ¼ 8 (delusional
patients with
schizophrenia);
N ¼ 8 (control)

Healthy adult (male
only)

N ¼ 33

Healthy adult

N ¼ 18

Healthy adult

N ¼ 19

Healthy adult

N ¼ 17

Jumping to Conclusions Bias
Moore & Sellen
(2006)

Beads task

Simulation results consistent with
increased activity in the mesolimbic
dopamine system (ventral striatum,
ventral tegmental area of the
midbrain)
Attributional Bias

Blackwood
et al. (2004)

Determine self-relevance of
ambiguous or unambiguous
neutral and threatening
statements

Lombardo et al.
(2009)

Make “mentalizing” or
“physical” judgments about
self or a familiar nonclose
other (the British Queen)

Mitchell et al.
(2005)

Evaluate “how pleased” or
“how symmetrical” faces
appeared
View a 15-min film and make
inferences about the mental
states or physical conditions
of movie characters
Determine whether to blame or
praise others based on
conjunctions of harmful,
helpful, and neutral
intentions and outcomes

Wolf et al.
(2010)
Young et al.
(2011)

Patients showed increased posterior
cingulate gyrus activation and
decreased rostral–ventral ACC
activation during self-relevance
evaluations relative to controls.
Preferential activation during
mentalizing (vs. physical) judgments
in ventral mPFC, PCC, TPJ, anterior
temporal lobe, and primary
sensorimotor cortex
Preferential activation of dorsal mPFC
during mentalizing (“how pleased”)
trials
Increased left TPJ and left precuneus
activation during mental state
inferences
TPJ (especially right hemisphere) and
mPFC activation strongest when
participants blamed or withheld
praise on the basis of an actor’s
reported intentions

Note: DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; IPFC, lateral prefrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; PCC, posterior
cingulate cortex; TPJ, temporoparietal junction.
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work of parietal, occipital, and orbital prefrontal regions in response to trials that incorporated fearful, but not happy, face
stimuli.
Monk et al. (2006) and Telzer et al. (2008) each focused on
adolescents; however, whereas Monk and colleagues (2006)
compared youths with generalized anxiety disorder and controls, Telzer et al. (2008) focused on associations between
normal-range trait anxiety and attention bias for angry faces
in a healthy sample. Each study yielded suggestions that varied PFC perturbations relate separately to anxiety and to
biased attention toward or away from threat. In the one study
to directly examine correlations among age, neural activity
patterns, and behaviorally observed attention biases in both
healthy adolescents and healthy adults, Lindstrom and colleagues (2009) found no evidence of an association between
age and either behaviorally observed threat biases or neural
activity associated with a bias to attend to threat.
Taken together, these findings from a small pool of neuroimaging studies suggest broadly that perturbations in different prefrontal regions, as well as a variety of areas across
the temporal, parietal, and occipital lobes, may support the
emergence of biased attentional processing of threat cues.
No clear developmental patterns of change in either attention
bias itself or in putative neural mechanisms have emerged yet
from research, but Lindstrom and colleagues’ (2009) study
comparing adults and adolescents provided an important first
step toward clarifying the neurodevelopmental course of this
cognitive characteristic. More study is needed, especially
with a specific focus on how these biases relate to paranoid
or persecutory ideation in addition to or instead of anxiety.
It also remains unclear whether and how attention bias for
threat per se might relate to elevated risk for aggression
among individuals who experience paranoid types of
thought. The few studies to date to examine attention bias
and aggression have focused primarily on biases for aggression-related words in adults who show other risk factors for
violence, including alcohol intoxication (Gallagher & Parrott,
2011) or Type A personality characteristics (Faunce, Mapledoram, & Job, 2004). Research examining the links between
heightened attention to cues of threat to self and risk for aggression, particularly in the context of paranoid thinking,
would help advance this literature and lay the foundation, if
associations emerged, for neuroimaging research targeted toward identifying their neural correlates.
Jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias
Garety and colleagues (e.g., Garety & Freeman, 1999; Garety
& Hemsley, 1994) coined the phrase “jumping-to-conclusions bias” to describe their findings that adults with delusions show an elevated tendency to rapidly accept hypotheses
on the basis of limited evidence and, to a lesser degree, a tendency to reject hypotheses more quickly than controls. Most
research on this bias has used iterations of the experimental
“beads task,” which requires individuals to guess which of
two jars (each holding beads of two colors in different ratios)
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a series of beads is drawn from. In a widely used variant, they
are permitted to request as many beads as they would like before making their guess (Garety & Freeman, 1999). Findings
commonly (but not uniformly; see, e.g., Colbert, Peters, &
Garety, 2010) show a bias to jump to conclusions or to request
a small number of beads before making a decision among
roughly half of adults who experience delusions, compared
to only 10% to 20% of nondelusional adults (for reviews,
see Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & Gold, 2007; Freeman, 2007;
Garety, Bebbington, Fowler, Freeman, & Kuipers, 2007).
At least one study demonstrates that the JTC bias is more
prevalent among adults who are specifically prone to persecutory delusions than among nonclinical controls (Startup,
Freeman, & Garety, 2008).
In the limited number of studies to date that examine JTC
biases in nonclinical populations, consistent associations
with paranoid ideation emerge. Freeman, Pugh, and Garety
(2008), for example, found a significant association between
a JTC bias and vulnerability to paranoid thoughts in a sample
of 200 adults drawn from the community. Similar findings
appeared in a study of 92 adults, with participants who endorsed high levels of paranoid ideation more quickly generating decisions than members of moderate- and low-paranoia
groups during a computerized social reasoning measure modeled on the beads task (Lincoln, Salzmann, Ziegler, & Westermann, 2011).
Psychological mechanisms underlying this bias remains
unclear; theorists have postulated variously that it stems
from a need for closure or avoidance of ambiguity (Bentall
et al., 2001), from a desire for rapid confirmation of threats
in the environment (Dudley & Over, 2003), from a tendency
to overattribute salience to currently experienced stimuli (Menon, Pomarol-Clotet, McKenna, & McCarthy, 2006), or from
an impaired ability to process and use sequential information
(Young & Bentall, 1995). In their thoughtful review of the literature, Fine and colleagues (2007) point out weaknesses and
unclear aspects of each of these hypotheses and call for
greater theoretical precision in considerations of the JTC
bias. Behavioral correlates of the JTC bias also have yet to
be elucidated; it is thus not clear whether and how a JTC
bias might relate to risk for aggressive behavior.
Very little empirical information is available regarding the
neural mechanisms of the JTC bias. Moore and Sellen (2006)
put forth a neural network model that implicates enhanced or
overactive mesolimbic dopamine (DA) system functioning in
the JTC bias in delusional patients and that may have applicability to healthy adults as well. The stress-sensitive mesolimbic DA system comprises the ventral striatum and the ventral
tegmental area of the midbrain; the ventral tegmentum provides the ventral striatum, a core structure within the affective
node of the SIPN, with dopaminergic input (Trainor, 2011).
Dysfunction in this system or its inputs has been implicated
in an array of psychological conditions, including schizophrenia (Stahl, 2007), substance abuse and addiction (Kauer &
Malenka, 2007), psychopathy (Buckholtz et al., 2010), and
depression (Nestler & Carlezon, 2006).
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Simulations of behavioral differences between delusional
individuals and controls during performance of the bead
task using Moore and Sellen’s (2006) model suggest that in
the context of delusions the elevated mesolimbic DA alters
representations of stimulus salience, which influences their
subsequent processing by regulatory and attentional systems
based in the PFC. It is notable that the results of simulations
were inconsistent with dysfunction in higher order attentional
processes; instead, the authors suggest that the altered salience representations generated via the striatum may differentially influence the allocation of attention.
This model is loosely consistent with the hypothesis that
the JTC bias stems from a tendency to overattribute salience
to environmental cues (e.g., Menon et al., 2006); empirical research comparing neural activation between actively paranoid
and control adults during paradigms modeled on the bead
task thus might be hypothesized to yield evidence of group
differences in patterns of ventral striatal activation during the
decision-making process. Ernst and Fudge’s (2009) triadic
model of the neural substrates of motivated decision making
might further suggest that these differences would be
less pronounced during adolescence, when striatal responsivity
is generally enhanced and prefrontal cortical attentional and
control processes are still maturing. Earlier in development,
it is unclear whether the JTC bias would manifest differentially among youths at either behavioral or neural levels. Research findings, however, show evidence of motivated
decision making as early as 24 months of age (Kenward,
Folke, Holmberg, Johansson, & Gredebäck, 2009), which
suggests that it may be possible to examine normative and
biased decision-making patterns well before youths reach
adolescence.
Whether and how the JTC bias might relate to elevated risk
for aggression remains unstudied. However, given the findings that link more broadly defined cognitive and behavioral
impulsivity and aggressive behavior (Elliott & Mirsky,
2002), it is plausible that this cognitive pattern might contribute to an individual’s vulnerability to aggress. Evidence that
anomalies in the ventral striatum structure and function may
also relate to both impaired processing of threat cues in humans and violent behavior in some species also make this
set of associations worthy of further examination (Calder,
Keane, Lawrence, & Manes, 2004; Ferrari, van Erp, Tornatzky, & Miczek, 2003).
Attributional bias
In the mid-20th century, personality theorists focused considerable attention on the idea that the appraisals and expectations that an individual attaches to a stimulus are as important
as or more important than actual stimulus characteristics in
determining the responses that the stimulus elicits (e.g., Bowers, 1973; Harvey, Hunt, & Schroder, 1961; Mischel, 1973).
Nasby, Hayden, and DePaulo (1980) conducted two studies
testing this theory in adolescent boys hospitalized for emotional problems; specifically, they examined the associations
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between aggressive behavior and a tendency to misattribute
hostility to nonverbal interpersonal cues. Their findings,
which were consistent with the presence of what they termed
“a generalized and marked attributional bias to infer hostility”
(p. 465), converged with those of Dodge (1980), who found
that aggressive, but not nonaggressive, school-aged boys
were likely to respond in a hostile manner to provocative
peer behavior that was ambiguous in its intent and to assume
that peer hostility drove such ambiguous behavior.
These landmark papers initiated a cascade of research on
the hostile attributional style, which shares notable similarities with paranoid patterns of thought. Over the subsequent
three decades, dozens of studies have explored the construct,
its developmental antecedents, and its associations with behavior, particularly aggression (for extensive and thorough
reviews, see De Castro et al., 2002; and Dodge, 2006). Dodge
and colleagues have built a particularly impressive body of
longitudinal research that elucidates the patterns of association between hostile attribution biases measured just prior
to kindergarten and aggressive behavior at numerous points
throughout childhood and adolescence (Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 1990; Dodge, Pettit, Bates, & Valente, 1995; Lansford,
Malone, Dodge, et al., 2006; Pettit, Bates, & Dodge, 1997).
A few recent studies also show evidence that hostile intent
attribution biases constitute a core element of paranoid
thought, both in healthy samples (Combs, Penn, Wichert, &
Waldheter, 2007; Fornells-Ambrojo & Garety, 2009) and in
adults with persecutory delusions (Combs et al., 2009). The
findings from one study in patients with either current or
past persecutory delusions suggest that negative attribution
biases such as these may be particularly pronounced in the
context of active paranoid thought (Lincoln, Mehl, Exner,
Lindenmeyer, & Rief, 2010). However, how such findings
might map onto normal-range paranoia is unclear.
Note that hostile intent attribution biases can function in
both adaptive and maladaptive ways. For some individuals
in chronically punitive environments, for example, intent attribution biases may foster resilience by diminishing risk for developing internalizing problems such as anxiety and depression that might emerge more commonly among those prone
to self-blame (Lansford, Malone, Stevens, et al., 2006). Proclivity to anticipate hostile behavior from others, however, is
also associated with elevated risk for engaging in aggression,
particularly reactive physical aggression, which constitutes retaliatory acts in response to perceived environmental threats
(Crick & Dodge, 1994; DeCastro et al., 2002; Dodge, 1980,
2003). In addition, although findings are less consistent than
for physical aggression, some researchers have found relationships between hostile intent attribution biases and relational
aggression toward others (Mathieson et al., 2011; Yeung &
Leadbeater, 2007; but see also Crain, Finch, & Foster, 2005;
Nelson, Mitchell, & Yang, 2008).
Hostile intent attribution biases appear to constitute one
link between early negative life experiences that vary from
peer rejection to physical abuse and later aggression (DeWall,
Twenge, Gitter, & Baumeister, 2009; Dodge et al., 1995; Re-

1040

ijntjes et al., 2011; Weiss, Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 1992).
Neural mechanisms of this set of associations have not
been well elucidated. Given that attributions of intent biases
call inherently upon one’s theory of mind or mentalizing skill,
the sizable and growing literature on neural activation during
these processes has the potential to inform hypotheses about
the neural substrates of hostile attributional styles and paranoid patterns of thought (Versmissen et al., 2008). Although
this literature only focuses on one set of intervening cognitive
processes between early experience and later behavior, it
nonetheless could serve as part of a foundation for integrative
research examining the dynamic interactions among negative
life experiences (or their absence), cognitive and psychological processes, and brain function as they relate to paranoia
and related patterns of thought.
The findings from a wide range of studies of healthy individuals converge to describe a complex network of brain regions that appear to be engaged during theory of mind or
mentalizing tasks, which involve reflection about one’s
own and others’ mental states. This network overlaps notably
with the affective and cognitive-regulatory nodes (Nelson
et al., 2005) and includes both the amygdala and PFC, particularly the medial regions (e.g., Lombardo et al., 2010;
Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005; Young, Scholz, & Saxe,
2011). In addition, a large body of research using varied measures of theory of mind also implicates the ACC, precuneus,
TPJ, insula, and temporal poles (e.g., Lombardo et al., 2010;
Mitchell et al., 2005; Wolf, Dziobek, & Heekeren, 2010; for
cogent and comprehensive reviews of the extensive neuroimaging literature on mentalizing and theory of mind, see
Amodio & Frith, 2006; Craig, 2009; Frith & Frith, 2003; Legrand & Ruby, 2009).
In one of the studies that best captures the overlap between
hostile intent attribution and theory of mind, the authors explicitly examined the impact of manipulating the valence of
intent perceptions in healthy adults and found evidence of
cortical activation specific to perceived hostile intent (Young
et al., 2011). The authors examined neural activity while
healthy adults evaluated whether to blame or praise others
based on conjunctions of harmful, helpful, and neutral intentions and outcomes. In both the TPJ (particularly in the right
hemisphere) and the medial PFC, activation was strongest
when participants blamed or withheld praise from an actor
solely on the basis of the actor’s reported intentions. It is plausible that individuals vulnerable to paranoid thinking might
show similar patterns of activation, but across a wider range
of trials, given that they would presumably also be prone to
make negative judgments in the context of both negative
and neutral intentions.
The results from one study comparing the neural activity
of psychiatric patients with active persecutory delusions
and healthy controls while they evaluated the self-relevance
of ambiguous versus unambiguous neutral and threatening
statements lend some support to this hypothesis (Blackwood
et al., 2004). Using measures previously examined in a small
sample of healthy controls (n ¼ 5; Blackwood et al., 2000),
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Blackwood and colleagues (2004) found different patterns
of peak activation between groups in both frontal and posterior regions of the brain. Whereas both groups showed significant activation during both neutral and threatening statements in the temporal poles, only controls showed elevated
activation in the anterior paracingulate cortex and both medial
and superior frontal cortical areas, and only patients showed
elevated activity in the posterior cingulate. However, the only
direct contrasts of patients and controls to yield evidence of
significantly stronger neural responses found greater anterior
cingulate activation in controls and greater posterior cingulate
activity in patients.
Thus, although the literature is still small, findings are beginning to suggest roles for a range of frontal, cingulate, and
temporoparietal regions in the evaluation of and generation of
responses to others’ intentions, consistent with involvement
of the cognitive-regulatory and affective nodes. Developmentally oriented neuroimaging research is much needed in this
area; most work to date focuses on adults, although a few researchers have begun to compare patterns of activation during
mentalizing tasks between healthy adolescents and adults
(e.g., Burnett & Blakemore, 2009). In addition, more work directed specifically at examining the neural correlates of explicitly hostile intent attribution biases, rather than simply attributions of intent, would help clarify the emergence of
atypical and typical patterns of social cognition and their
links with aggressive behavior.
Discussion and Conclusions
Research on paranoid thinking and its potential association
with aggression that adopts a developmental psychopathology perspective is only beginning to emerge; research on
the ways in which biological substrates figure in the development of a paranoid style of cognition, particularly outside of
the context of psychosis, is even more limited. By examining
the data regarding the behavioral and neural correlates of varied cognitive processes that are likely components of a paranoid thinking style, it may be possible to advance both theoretical and empirical research in this domain. The present
article constitutes an effort to summarize a select portion of
the work on paranoid thought and a few of its cognitive components that have been articulated more or less thoroughly
across development. A few key points emerge to guide future
research.
First, although the research base is small, convergent evidence suggests that dysfunction in the SIPN, particularly the
affective and cognitive-regulatory nodes and related structures, may be associated with the emergence of paranoid
thinking across the spectrum from normal range to clinically
significant, at least in adults. Prefrontal involvement is the
most common finding across component cognitive processes
and paradigms under study; however, structures that participate in the evaluation of stimulus valence, salience, and threat
value also appear worthy of further attention. It may be of
value to combine novel paradigms that elicit paranoid types
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of thought, such as a virtual reality task that Freeman, Pugh,
Vorontsova, Antley, and Slater (2010) developed to simulate
real life neutral and hostile interactions, with neuroimaging
tools to better characterize what occurs in the brain when
paranoid thoughts are active.
Second, it will be critically important for researchers to
clarify when paranoid patterns of thought, both clinically significant and normal range, first emerge in development and
what factors produce and maintain them. The hostile intent attribution bias literature provides much relevant data; however, because the conceptual overlap between hostile intent
attribution biases and paranoia is incomplete, many questions
remain about how early and under what circumstances an individual might begin to think consistently in a paranoid way.
Similar developmental extension of the neuroimaging literature to younger samples would be of value; researchers have
had impressive success in completing functional scans of
children as young as preschoolers (e.g., Gaffrey et al.,
2011; James & Maouene, 2009), and replication of adult studies across the early life span would provide useful data regarding patterns of change and consistency.
Third, although links between paranoid thought and aggression are unclear and appear to be mediated by an array
of variables, there is some evidence of consistency between
patterns of brain function and dysfunction associated with
the two. Regions of the PFC, for instance, which have been
implicated in the emergence of reactive aggression in some
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samples (Blair, 2010), might show similarly atypical activity
in the context of active paranoid or suspicious thought. A
number of neural circuits that show links to impulsive aggression also overlap with those that appear relevant to paranoid
types of thought (Coccaro, Sripada, Yanowitch, & Phan,
2011). Adaptation of interactive neuroimaging paradigms,
such as the rejection-simulating cyberball task (Eisenberger,
Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), that could both elicit paranoid ideation and provide opportunities for aggressive, neutral, or prosocial responses, might help clarify areas of convergence and divergence in the neural substrates of
paranoid thinking and aggression.
Fourth, given that findings relevant to the understanding of
paranoid thought and its neural mechanisms are emerging
from studies of both clinical/high-risk (e.g., Kumari et al.,
2011; Tost et al., 2010; Whalley et al., 2007; Williams
et al., 2007) and healthy samples (e.g., Prévost et al., 2011),
crosstalk between researchers in both realms will facilitate
much more rapid advancement of the field. Similar collaborations among researchers focused on different developmental
periods, with attention to finding common conceptual ground
in the absence of consistent labels, would be of value. For example, bringing together scholars who study the normative
development of trust in children (e.g., Sharp, Ha, & Fonagy,
2011) and those who study the correlates of extreme mistrust
(i.e., persecutory delusions) may lead to novel and illuminating hypotheses and findings.
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